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COURT REPORTS

STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
In re The Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
Gila River Sys. and Source, 224 P.3d 178 (Ariz. 2010) (holding
that the lower court correctly approved the Gila River Indian
Community's settlement agreement as all of the requirements of
the Special Procedural Order for the Approval of Federal Water
Rights Settlements, Including Those of Indian Tribes were met,
and, further, that the objecting parties were not bound to the
agreement and could assert their rights in subsequent general
adjudications if needed).
In 2004, Congress passed the Arizona Water Settlements Act
("AWSA"). Title II of AWSA authorizes the settlement of the
federal water rights claims of the Gila River Indian Community
In the subsequent settlement agreement, GRIC
("GRIC").
received 653,500 acre-feet of water per year in exchange for a
waiver of claims to damages to water resources, greater diversion
rights, and the right to contest certain uses of Gila River water.
In May of 2006, the parties to the settlement agreement
submitted the agreement to the Superior Court of Maricopa
County ("lower court") for approval. Several groups objected to
the agreement, including the San Carlos Apache Tribe, the
Nation
and
the Yavapai-Apache
Tonto Apache Tribe,
(collectively, the "Apache Tribes"); a number of communities
that depend on the water from the Gila River, collectively
identified as the Lower Gila Water Users ("LGWUs"); and
ASARCO LLC. The lower court, limiting its inquiry to issues
covered by the 1991 Special Procedural Order for the Approval
of Federal Water Rights Settlements, Including Those of Indian
Tribes, ("Special Order") rejected the objections of these groups,
and entered a judgment approving the GRIC settlement. The
Apache Tribes, LGWUs, and ARASCO requested an interlocutory
appeal. The Arizona Supreme Court granted the request.
The Special Order, a previous creation of the Arizona
Supreme Court, required lower courts to approve settlement
agreements when they found by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (1) the amount of water granted was no greater than that
which could have been proven at trial; (2) the objectors' claimed
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contending that it placed unreasonable limitations on settlement review
that unfairly prevented them from raising arguments regarding the
constitutionality, legality, and fairness of the settlement agreement.
The court rejected these broad arguments, maintaining that the Special
Order did not arbitrarily limit the scope of review of settlements.
Further, the court noted that settlements that meet the conditions of
the Special Order are actually beneficial to all parties as they reduce the
amount of water claimed by a given Indian tribe to an amount below
that which the tribe could have proven at trial.
The parties also made specific objections to the GRIC settlement.
All three objecting parties contended that the settlement agreement did
in fact materially injure their claimed water rights. The court
responded by pointing out the fact that the Special Order required the
approval of settlement agreements despite potential material injuries to
objectors' claimed water rights when the agreement was not binding on
the objectors; thus, this left the parties free to assert their rights in
subsequent general adjudications. In this case, contrary to the assertion
of the LGWUs, the settlement agreement was not binding on any of the
objectors, so the lower court did not err by approving the settlement
agreement despite concerns of material injury to the objectors' claimed
water rights.
The Apache Tribes also argued that the settlement would provide
GRIC more water than it could have proven at trial, and that the
settlement would adversely affect the quality of their own water.
Regarding the former claim, the court noted that the settlement
provided less water for GRIC than the Global Equity Decree had
previously allocated. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower
court's holding that the settlement indeed provided less water than
could have been proven at trial. Turning to the issue of water quality,
the court observed that the Special Order is concerned only with the
quantity of water claimed; the question of water quality falls outside of
the scope of the Special Order, and thus was inappropriate for
consideration by the lower court.
The objecting parties further argued that the settlement agreement
violated GRIC's contractual agreements with both ASARCO and the
Arlington Canal Company ("Arlington"). In response, the court noted
that contractual claims do not fall under the scope of the Special Order.
Hence, even if the settlement agreement did create contract disputes,
ASARCO and Arlington could assert their rights in later adjudications.
Finally, ASARCO contended that the safe-harbor provisions of the
settlement agreement violated the Arizona Constitution by denying
ASARCO equal protection and conferring a special benefit to GRIC.
The court replied to this objection by maintaining that the safe-harbor
argument was outside the scope of the Special Order, and, further, that
the argument was without merit as the agreement neither infringed
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upon ASARCO's equal protection rights nor provided special benefits
to GRIC.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's approval of the
GRIC settlement agreement.
James Henderson
COLORADO
City of Aurora v. ACJ P'ship, 209 P.3d 1076 (Colo. 2009) (holding that
the City of Aurora could not be granted conditional water storage rights
for its proposed reservoir site as the City could not satisfy the statutory
"can and will" requirement because of a pre-existing contractual
agreement between the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners
and Rangeview Metropolitan District).
The City of Aurora ("Aurora") filed an application for conditional
water storage rights for a proposed project that would divert water from
the Platte River into a new "East Reservoir." Aurora had not yet
determined where this reservoir would be located, so the application
contained requests for conditional water storage rights for six potential
sites. Three of the proposed sites are located on the former Lowry
Bombing Range ("Lowry Range"), which is administered by the
Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board"). Several
years prior, the Land Board and Rangeview Metropolitan District
("Rangeview") entered into a restated lease agreement that designated
four sites on the Lowry Range for use by Rangeview for future
reservoirs. As part of this lease agreement, Rangeview obtained nonexclusive rights-of-way for its reservoir sites. Three of Aurora's six
proposed sites significantly overlapped with the four Rangeview sites.
The Land Board rejected Aurora's request for access to the
disputed sites, noting that allowing this access would require Rangeview
to give up one or more of its sites and that the contractual arrangement
prohibited the Land Board from doing this without Rangeview's
consent In the subsequent action before the District Court, Water
Division 1 ("water court"), Rangeview requested a partial summary
judgment based on the assertion that Aurora could not satisfy the "can
and will" requirement for conditional water rights. To acquire a
conditional water right, an applicant must demonstrate that "there is a
substantial probability that the applicant can and will complete the
appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time." Because of
the lease agreement and the Land Board's rejection of Aurora's
request, the water court agreed with Rangeview that Aurora could not
satisfy this requirement, and subsequently granted the motion for a
partial summary judgment. Aurora appealed the partial summary
judgment and dismissal of its claim for conditional water storage rights
for the three disputed sites.
On appeal, Aurora maintained that the Land Board could have
granted access to the disputed sites without violating its contractual
arrangement with Rangeview for two reasons: (I) Rangeview's right-of-

